| 1 2 | Gary M. Hoffman (<i>Pro Hac Vice</i>) Kenneth W. Brothers(<i>Pro Hac Vice</i>) DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO MORIN | | |
|-----|--|---|--|
| 3 | & OSHINSKY, LLP 2101 L Street, NW | | |
| 4 | Washington, DC 20037-1526 Phone (202) 785-9700 | | |
| 5 | Fax (202) 887-0689 | | |
| 6 | Edward A. Meilman (<i>Pro Hac Vice</i>) DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO MORIN | | |
| 7 | & OSHINSKY, LLP 1177 Avenue of the Americas | | |
| 8 | New York, New York 10036-2714 Phone (212) 835-1400 Fax (212) 997-9880 | | |
| 9 | Jeffrey B. Demain, State Bar No. 126715 | | |
| 10 | Jonathan Weissglass, State Bar No. 185008 ALTSHULER, BERZON, NUSSBAUM, RU | BIN & DEMAIN | |
| 11 | 177 Post Street, Suite 300 San Francisco, California 94108 | | |
| 12 | Phone (415) 421-7151 Fax (415) 362-8064 | | |
| 13 | Attorneys for Ricoh Company, Ltd. | | |
| 14 | | | |
| 15 | | | |
| 16 | UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA | | |
| 17 | SAN FRA | ANCISCO DIVISION | |
| 18 | | | |
| 19 | SYNOPSYS, INC., |)) CASE NO. C-03-2289-MJJ | |
| 20 | Plaintiff, |) | |
| 21 | , | DECLARATION OF MICHAEL WEINSTEIN IN SUPPORT OF RICOH'S NOTICE OF | |
| 22 | VS. |) MOTION AND MOTION FOR APPROVAL) OF PROTECTIVE ORDER AND | |
| 23 | RICOH COMPANY, LTD., |) SUPPORTING BRIEF) | |
| 24 | Defendant. |) Date: February 10, 2004 Time: 9:30 a.m. Courtroom: 11 | |
| 25 | | | |
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| 27 | | | |
| 28 | | | |
| | | | |

CASE NOS. C-03-2289 MJJ MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 9

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Michael A. Weinstein declares as follows:


- 1. My name is Michael A. Weinstein, an attorney with the law firm of Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin & Oshinsky, LLP, counsel for Ricoh Company Limited ("Ricoh"). I am over the age of 21 and am competent to make this declaration. Based on my personal knowledge and information, I hereby declare to all the facts in this declaration
- 2. Attached hereto as Ex. 1 is a true and correct copy of the Stipulated Protective Order from *Ricoh v. Aeroflex et al* dated 6/9/03.
- 3. Attached hereto as Ex. 2 is a true and correct copy of the DSMO Letter from E. Meilman to E. Moller dated 11/3/03
- 4. Attached hereto as Ex. 3 is a true and correct copy of the Howrey Letter, with attachment, from C. Kelley to E. Meilman dated 11/7/03
- 5. Attached hereto as Ex. 4 is a true and correct copy of the DSMO Letter from E. Meilman to E. Moller dated 11/20/03.
- 6. Attached hereto as Ex. 5 is a true and correct copy of the Howrey Letter from E. Moller to E. Meilman dated 12/7/03.
- 7. Attached hereto as Ex. 6 is a true and correct copy of Howrey Letter, with attachments, from E. Moller to E. Meilman dated 11/13/03.
- 8. Attached hereto as Ex. 7 is a composite exhibit which are true and correct copies of printouts of websites discussing SURF dated 1/6/04. The source of each web page print out is indicated on the bottom of each printed page.
- 9. Attached hereto as Ex. 8 is a true and correct copy of the Stipulated Protective order form from the North District of California website.
- 10. Attached hereto as Ex. 9 is a true and correct copy of the transcript of Case Management Conference in *Ricoh v. Aeroflex et al* dated 5/16/03.

11. Counsel for Ricoh met and conferred with counsel for Synopsys in November and December, 2003 and discussed, among other issues, a designation of a secure facility to safeguard software source code. However, the parties were unable to reach an agreement designating a secure facility.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. Signed at Washington, D.C. on January 6, 2004.

/s Michael A. Weinstein Michael A. Weinstein

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE



STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER

WHEREAS the parties are or may be competitors and believe that confidential information about certain of its research and development activities and other confidential information concerning its activities constitute very valuable commercial information that, if disclosed to competitors or others, would significantly harm it, and

WHEREAS each of the parties expects certain documents, things, and information that are or will be encompassed by discovery demands made to each other or to non-parties constitute trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information within the meaning of Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Each of the parties hereby stipulates that the following Stipulated Protective Order may be entered by the Court:

Page 3 of 14

- 1. All Confidential Information produced or exchanged in the course of this litigation shall be used solely for the purpose of preparation and trial of this litigation and for no other purpose whatsoever, and shall not be disclosed to any person except in accordance with the terms hereof.
- 2. "Confidential Information," as used herein, means any information of any type, kind or character that is designated as "Confidential" by any of the supplying or receiving parties, whether it be a document, information contained in a document, information revealed during a deposition, information revealed in an interrogatory answer or otherwise. In designating information as "Confidential," a party will make such designation only as to that information that it in good faith believes contains "Confidential Information."
- 3. (a) "Confidential Information" includes, but is not limited to, (i) proprietary technical information and specifications, (ii) trade secrets (iii) confidential know-how, and (iv) proprietary business and financial information and any other non-public information, the disclosure of which is likely to have the effect of causing significant competitive harm to the disclosing party or party from which the information was obtained. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to limit the description of "Confidential Information" set forth in paragraph 2.
- (b) Nothing shall be regarded as "Confidential Information" if it is information that:
 - (i) is in the public domain at the time of disclosure, as evidenced by a written document;
 - (ii) becomes part of the public domain through no fault of the other party, as evidenced by a written document;
 - (iii) was in the receiving party's rightful and lawful possession at the time of disclosure, as evidenced by a written document; or

- (iv) is lawfully received by the receiving party from a third party at a later date without restriction as to disclosure, provided such third party has the right to make the disclosure to the receiving party.
- 4. "Oualified Persons," as used herein means:
- (a) To the Court and its officers and staff, including court reporters;
- (b) Outside attorneys of record for the parties in this litigation and employees of such attorneys to whom it is necessary that the material be shown for purposes of this litigation;
- (c) Outside experts, consultants, advisors or investigators (collectively referred to hereafter as "experts") who have signed an undertaking pursuant to paragraph 5 but only after compliance with the provisions of paragraph 5 below;
- (d) To non-party support services including, but not limited to, court reporters, outside copy services, document imaging and database services, design services who have signed confidentiality agreements, jury consultants who have signed confidentiality agreements, mock jurors who have signed confidentiality agreements, and language translators who have signed confidentiality agreements (including support staff) as may be reasonably necessary in connection with the preparation or conduct of this action;
 - (e) Anyone to whom the parties consent in writing:
- (f) If this Court so elects, any other person may be designated as a Qualified Person by order of this Court, after notice and opportunity to be heard to all parties.
- 5. Prior to the disclosure of any "Confidential Information" to any expert under Paragraph 4(c), counsel for the Party seeking to make the disclosure shall: (i) deliver a copy of this Protective Order as entered to such person, explain its terms to such person, and secure the signature of such person on a written undertaking in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A, and (ii) transmit by facsimile and mail to counsel for the other Parties a copy of the signed Exhibit A,

Page 5 of 14

6. (a) Documents produced in this action may be designated by any party or parties as "Confidential" by marking each page of the document(s) with the designation "Confidential."

Qualified Person to sign a written undertaking.

Page 6 of 14

- (b) In lieu of marking the original of a document, if the original is not produced, the designating party may mark the copies that are produced or exchanged. Originals shall be preserved for inspection.
- (c) If the document is not in paper form, the producing person or entity shall use other such reasonable means as necessary to identify clearly the document or information as "Confidential."
- 7. Discovery responses or other litigation materials may be designated by any party or parties as "Confidential" by marking each page of the response with the designation "Confidential."
- 8. The designation of information disclosed during a deposition as "Confidential" shall be made either by a statement on the record at the deposition or within twenty (20) calendar days after receipt by counsel of a copy of the deposition transcript. Such designation will be applied to only those portions of the deposition transcript that include a specific question and response or series of questions and responses containing "Confidential Information." The deposition transcript shall be printed in consecutive pages (whether or not some pages are designated as "Confidential") with a marking on the cover of the deposition transcript indicating the "Confidential" designation contained therein. Unless previously designated otherwise, all deposition transcripts shall be treated as "Confidential" in their entirety prior to the end of the twenty (20) calendar day period following receipt by counsel of a copy of the deposition transcript.
- 9. "Confidential Information" shall not be disclosed or made available by the receiving party to persons other than Qualified Persons except that nothing herein is intended to prevent individuals who are in-house counsel or a member of the professional legal department

of the Parties from having access to pleadings, briefs and exhibits or declarations filed with the Court and expert reports, including exhibits, that are designated as "Confidential."

- (a) Documents to be inspected shall be treated as "Confidential" although such 10. documents need not be marked as "Confidential" prior to inspection. At the time of copying for the receiving parties, any documents containing "Confidential Information" shall be stamped prominently "Confidential" by the producing party.
- (b) Nothing herein shall prevent disclosure beyond the terms of this Order if each party designating the information as "Confidential" consents to such disclosure or if the Court, after notice to all effected parties, orders such disclosures. Nothing herein shall prevent any counsel of record from utilizing "Confidential Information" in the examination or crossexamination of any person who is indicated on the document as being an author, source or recipient of the "Confidential Information," irrespective of which party produced such information. Nothing herein shall prevent any counsel of record from utilizing "Confidential Information" in the examination or cross-examination of any person who is a current or former officer, director or employee of the party so designating the information as "Confidential" or of the party that produced the information or of a related entity.
- If a party inadvertently discloses any document or thing containing information 11. that it deems confidential without designating it as "Confidential," the disclosing party shall promptly upon discovery of such inadvertent disclosure inform the receiving party in writing. and the receiving party and all Qualified Persons possessing such information shall thereafter treat the information as "Confidential" under this Order. To the extent such information may have been disclosed to persons other than Qualified Persons described in this document, the receiving party shall make every reasonable effort to retrieve the information promptly from such persons and to avoid any further disclosure to and by such persons.

- 12. A party shall not be obligated to challenge the propriety of a designation as "Confidential" at the time made, and a failure to do so shall not preclude a subsequent challenge thereto. Nor will the failure to object be construed as an admission that any particular "Confidential Information" contains or reflects currently valuable trade secrets or confidential commercial information. In the event that any party to this litigation disagrees at any stage of these proceedings with the designation by the designating party of any information as "Confidential," or the designation of any person as a Qualified Person, the parties shall first try to resolve such dispute in good faith on an informal basis, such as production of redacted copies. If the parties are unsuccessful in informally resolving any disputes regarding the designation of any document or information as "Confidential," the Court shall resolve all such disputes. It shall be the burden of the party making any designation to establish that the information so designated is "Confidential" within the meaning of this Protective Order. The "Confidential Information" that is the subject of the dispute shall be treated as originally designated pending resolution of the dispute.
- 13. The parties may, by written stipulation filed and approved by the Court, amend this Order, and any party may seek an order of this Court modifying this Protective Order. The parties agree to meet and confer prior to seeking to modify this Protective Order. In addition, the Court may modify this Protective Order in the interest of justice or otherwise at the Court's discretion.
- 14. In the event a party wishes to use any "Confidential Information" in any affidavits, briefs, memoranda of law, or other papers filed with the Court in this litigation, such "Confidential Information" used therein shall be filed under seal with the Court.
- 15. The Clerk of this Court is directed to maintain under seal all documents and transcripts of deposition testimony and answers to interrogatories, admissions and other

pleadings filed under seal with the Court in this litigation that have been designated, in whole or in part, as "Confidential" by a party to this action.

- If a Party intends to offer into evidence or otherwise disclose in open court any "Confidential Information" designated by another person or entity, counsel for such Party shall notify the designating person or entity that the Party intends to disclose "Confidential Information" in open court prior to the disclosure, so that the designating person or entity may confer with the Court concerning appropriate procedures for protecting its "Confidential Information."
- 17. In the event any person or party that has possession, custody, or control of any information designated as "Confidential" pursuant to the terms of this Protective Order receives a subpoena or other process or order to produce such information, such person or party shall notify by mail within five (5) business days of the Party's receipt of the request, the counsel for the party or persons claiming confidential treatment of the documents sought by such subpoenas or other process or order, shall furnish such counsel with a copy of said subpoena or other process or order, and shall cooperate with respect to any procedure sought to be pursued by the party whose interests may be affected. The party asserting the "Confidential" treatment shall have the burden of defending against such subpoena, process or order. The person or party receiving the subpoena or process or order shall be entitled to comply with it except: (a) to the extent the party asserting the "Confidential" treatment is successful in obtaining an order modifying or quashing it; and (b) in complying with the process or order shall, at a minimum, seek to obtain "Confidential" treatment of the "Confidential Information" before producing it in the other proceeding or action.
- 18. If the discovery process calls for the production of information that a Party or Non-Party does not wish to produce because the Party or Non-Party believes its disclosure would

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breach an agreement with another person or entity to maintain such information in confidence, the disclosing Party or Non-Party promptly shall give written notice to the other person or entity that its information is subject to discovery in this litigation, and shall provide such person or entity with a copy of this Protective Order. When such written notice is given to the person or entity, the disclosing Party or Non-Party will advise the potential receiving Party that such notice has been given. The person or entity whose information may be subject to discovery shall have ten (10) business days from receipt of the written notice in which to seek relief from the Court, if the person or entity so desires. If the ten (10) business days elapse without the person or entity seeking relief from the Court, the requested information shall be produced in accordance with the terms of this Protective Order.

- 19. In the event that additional persons or entities become Parties, none of such Parties' counsel, experts or consultants retained to assist said counsel, shall have access to "Confidential Information" produced by or obtained from any other producing person or entity until said Party has executed and filed with the Court its agreement to be fully bound by this Protective Order.
- 20. This Protective Order shall apply to the parties and any non-party from whom discovery may be sought and who desires protection for the discovery sought. Thus, any nonparty requested or required to produce or disclose information in this proceeding, through subpoena or otherwise, may designate such information pursuant to the terms of this Protective Order.
- 21. (a) Nothing herein requires disclosure of information, documents or things which the disclosing entity contends is protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product exception. Nothing herein shall preclude any party from moving this Court for an order directing the disclosure of such information, documents or things.

- (b) In the event that any privileged attorney-client or work product documents or things are inadvertently produced for inspection and/or provided, the disclosing party shall identify such documents or things within five (5) days of when it discovers that the privileged materials were inadvertently produced for inspection and/or provided, and either (1) copies shall not be provided, or (2) if copies have already been provided, all copies in the receiving party's possession shall be promptly returned (and not relied upon) by the receiving party. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the receiving party from contending that the identified materials are not privileged, that the material was not inadvertently produced, or that privilege was waived for reasons other than mere inadvertent production of the material.
- 22. Within ninety (90) days after conclusion of this litigation and any and all appeals thereof, any document and all reproductions of "Confidential" documents produced by a party that are in the possession of any Qualified Person shall be returned to the producing party or, with the consent of the producing party, destroyed. If destroyed, counsel for the receiving party shall certify to counsel for the producing party compliance with this paragraph within fourteen (14) calendar days of such destruction. Outside counsel for each party may maintain in its files one copy of all material produced as well as all materials filed with or otherwise presented to the Court, deposition and trial transcripts, and work product (regardless of whether such materials contain or refer to "Confidential" materials). If counsel retains such materials, the materials which contain Confidential Information shall be accessible only by Qualified Persons defined in paragraph 4(b) above. As far as the provisions of any protective orders entered in this action restrict the communication and use of the documents produced thereunder, such orders shall continue to be binding after the conclusion of this litigation including any subsequent appeals or later proceedings, except that (a) there shall be no restriction on documents that are used as exhibits in Court unless such exhibits were filed under seal, and (b) a party may seek the written

permission of the producing party or order of the Court with respect to dissolution or modification of such protective orders. The Court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the performance of said obligations.

- 23. This Order shall not bar any attorney herein in the course of rendering advice to his client with respect to this litigation from conveying to any party client his evaluation in a general way of "Confidential Information" produced or exchanged herein; provided, however, that in rendering such advice and otherwise communicating with his client, the attorney shall not disclose the specific contents of any "Confidential Information" produced by another party herein, which disclosure would be contrary to the terms of this Protective Order.
- 24. This Protective Order may be executed in two or more counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which shall constitute one and the same instrument.

SO ORDERED this 9th day of June, 2003.

11

AGREEL

Robert W. Whetzel (#2288)

Steven J. Fineman (#4025) Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A.

One Rodney Square
Post Office Box 551

Wilmington, Delaware 19899

(302) 651-7700

Gary M. Hoffman Eric Oliver

DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO MORIN &

OSHINSKY LLP

2101 L Street NW

Washington, D.C. 20037-1526

(202) 828-4879

Edward A. Meilman
DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO MORIN &
OSHINSKY LLP

1177 Avenue of the America

New York, New York 10036 (212) 896-5471

·

Counsel for Plaintiff, Ricoh Company Ltd. Francis DiGiovanni (#3189)

Connolly Bove Lodge

& Hutz LLP

1220 Market Street

P.O. Box 2207

Wilmington, DE 19801

(302) 658-9141

Attorneys for Defendants

OF COUNSEL:

Teresa M. Corbin

Howrey Simon Arnold & White, LLP

301 Ravenswood Ave.

Menlo Park, CA 94025

(650) 463-8100

Attorneys for Defendants

Alan H. MacPherson

MacPherson Kwok Chen & Heid LLP

2001 Gateway Place, Suite 195E

San Jose, CA 95014

(408) 392-9250

Attorney for AMI Semiconductor, Inc.

EXHIBIT A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

| RICOH COMPANY, LTD., |) | |
|---|--------|----------------------|
| Plaintiff, |) | C.A. No. 03-103-GMS |
| v. |) | C.A. 140, 03-103-GMS |
| AEROFLEX INCORPORATED, AMI SEMICONDUCTOR, INC., MATROX |) | |
| ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS LTD., MATROX GRAPHICS INC., MATROX |) | |
| INTERNATIONAL CORP. and MATROX TECH, INC. |) } | |
| Defendants. |)) | |

UNDERTAKING

| My name is | . I hereby acknowledge that I have been provided |
|---|---|
| with a copy of, have read, and am fully farr | ailiar with, the terms of the Stipulated Protective |
| Order entered in this action on, | 2003. I agree to be bound by, and to comply fully |
| with, the terms of the Protective Order. I agre | e not to disclose or disseminate any "Confidential |
| Information," as defined by the Stipulated Prot | ective Order, except as permitted therein. |
| I hereby submit myself to the jurisdie | ction of the United States District Court for the |
| District of Delaware in connection with the enf | orcement of the Protective Order. |
| Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1746, I declar | e under penalty of perjury under the laws of the |
| United States of America that the fore | egoing is true and correct. Executed on |
| , 2003. | |
| | |
| | |

EXHIBIT 2

DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO MORIN & OSHINSKY LLP

1177 Avenue of the Americas • New York, New York 10036-2714
Tel (212) 835-1400 • Fax (212) 997-9880

Writer's Direct Diel (212) 896-5471

Writer's Direct Dial: (212) 896-5471
E-Mail Address: MeilmanE@dsmo.com

November 3, 2003

BY FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

Erik K. Moller, Esq. Howrey Simon Arnold & White, LLP 301 Ravenswood Avenue Menlo Park, CA 94025-3434

Re:

Ricoh Company Ltd. v. Aeroflex Incorporated, et al.

Snyopsys, Inc v. Ricoh Company Ltd.

Our Ref.: R2180.0171

Dear Mr. Moller:

In response to your telefax of October 31, 2003, we do not see the need to negotiate a Protective Order when our two firms have already done so and a court has issued it, Judge Jenkins has already ordered Synopsys to proceed under the issued Order and Synopsys has done so. That Order provides the parties with the appropriate protection of confidential information. There is no reason it should not apply to both actions. Nevertheless, if you want to us to consider changes in the Order already in place, please send us a marked up copy with your proposed changes and indicate why the changes are appropriate.

Very truly yours,

Edward A. Meilman

EAM/rr

cc: Gary Hoffman, Esq.

Kenneth Brothers, Esq. Jeffrey Demain, Esq.



November 7, 2003

301 RAVENSWOOD AVENUE MENLO PARK, CA 94025-3434 PHONE 650.463.8100 FAX 650.463.8400 A LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP

CHRISTOPHER L. KELLEY PARTNER 650.463.8113 kelleyc@howrcy.com

VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

Edward A. Meilman Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky, LLP 1177 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036-2714

Re: Rice

Ricoh Company, Ltd. v. Aeroflex Incorporated, et al.

Civil Action No. 03-103-GMS

Dear Edward:

I am writing in response to your letters of November 5. We propose a meet and confer to address the issues raised in these letters. We are available at 11 AM Pacific Coast Time (2 PM Eastern) on Tuesday, November 11. If this time is unacceptable, please propose an alternative time.

With respect to the subpoena on Synopsys, we informed you in our letter of October 22 that the notice of deposition of Synopsys was ineffective because you made no attempt to confer with us regarding a reasonable date for the deposition in advance of your notice. This is a basic requirement under N.D. Cal. Local Rule 30-1. If you intend to take the position that Rule 30 does not apply to depositions of third-parties and that the Northern District does not intend counsel to coordinate with third-parties prior to setting depositions, please let us know immediately. We have a contrary construction and we will need to seek the intervention of the Court if you stand by your position. In addition to this basic procedural requirement, we also believe that the topics identified in your notice are improper for a number of reasons set out in our previous letters. In addition, this deposition should be taken in connection with Synopsys' declaratory judgment action, especially given that the Delaware defendants have moved the Court to stay Ricoh's patent infringement action. We intend to discuss these issues in the proposed meet and confer in order to avoid the need to seek a motion to quash.

With regard to the protective order, you once again assert that "Judge Jenkins already ordered Synopsys to proceed under the Order issued by the Court in the Ricoh v. Aeroflex case." We suppose that you are referring to the fact that Judge Jenkins accepted a stipulation of the parties that an agreement presented by Synopsys at the August 19 hearing would be protected from dissemination pursuant to the protective order in place in Delaware. See 8/19/2003 Tr. at 13:4-20. It seems to us to be pure fantasy to assert that the Court's statement on page 13 constituted a ruling that the Ricoh v. Aeroflex order ought to govern all subsequent discovery in

Edward A. Meilman November 7, 2003 Page 2

the Synopsys v. Ricoh matter. If this is, in fact, your position please state so plainly so that we can inquire directly of the Court as to whether that was its intent.

Your letter tries to make a great deal of the fact that this law firm is representing the defendants in the Ricoh v. Aeroflex case as well as Synopsys. That fact, however, is irrelevant to the question of whether the protections that were adequate to protect production from the Ricoh v. Aeroflex defendants are adequate to protect the production of highly confidential source code from Synopsys in the Synopsys v. Ricoh case.

As you observe in your letter, the protective order proposed by Synopsys is not merely a version of the Ricoh v. Aeroflex order with additional content. It is, in fact, based on the model Stipulated Protective Order on the Northern District's website. It is not critical to us whether the parties base their protective order on the Ricoh v. Aeroflex order or the Northern District's model order, as modified in Synopsys' original proposal. Synopsys does, however, wish to include a provision dealing with the disclosure of source code. I am attaching a copy of the relevant language that we wish to incorporate to address the production of source code.

Very truly yours,

pristopher L. Kelley

CLK:gg

cc: Gary M. Hoffman, Esq.

ATTACHMENT

Disclosure of Source Code

- (a) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court or permitted in writing by the Producing Party, a Receiving Party's access to a Producing Party's discoverable source code is limited to inspection at a secured facility provided by the Producing Party. Such inspection may be conducted only by:
 - (1) the Receiving Party's Outside Counsel of record in this action; and,
 - (2) one (1) expert (as defined in this Order) of the Receiving Party to whim disclosure is reasonably necessary for this litigation and who has signed the "Agreement to Be Bound by Protective Order" (Exhibit __) and who has been approved pursuant to the "Procedures for Approving Disclosure of 'CONFIDENTIAL' information or Items to 'Experts'" as set forth in paragraph __;
- (b) After any such inspection and upon the written request of the Receiving Party's Outside Counsel, the Responding Party, within a reasonable time, shall furnish hard-copy printouts of relevant source code files specifically identified in the Receiving Party's Outside Counsel's written request. Such hard-copy printouts shall be designated "CONFIDENTIAL" under this protective order;
- (c) Any notes taken or any other information created by Outside Counsel or the expert of the Receiving Party at or based on any such inspection shall be treated as "CONFIDENTIAL" under this protective order;
- (d) Each Producing Party designates and provides the following facilities for production of their discoverable source code via inspection in the present action:
 - (1) All source code production by Synopsys in this action will be limited to inspection at its Secured User Research Facility (SURF). SURF is Synopsys' physically

and electronically secured area for providing access to Synopsys' source code. SURF is located at Synopsys' Corporate campus in Mountain View, CA.

(2) All source code provided by Ricoh will be produced _____.

DICKSTEIN SHAPIRO MORIN & OSHINSKY LLP

1177 Avenue of the Americas • New York, NY 10036-2714 Tel (212) 835-1400 • Fax (212) 997-9880

> Writer's Direct Dial: (212) 896-5471 E-Mail Address: MeilmanE@dsmo.com

> > November 20, 2003

BY FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

Erik K. Moller, Esq. Howrey Simon Arnold & White, LLP 301 Ravenswood Avenue Menlo Park, CA 94025-3434

Re:

Synopsys, Inc. v. Ricoh Company, Ltd.

Case No. CV 03-02289 MJJ

Ricoh Company, Ltd. v. Aeroflex Inc., et al.

Case No. CV 03-04669 MMJ Our Ref.: R2180.0171

Dear Erik:

With regard to the protective order, we believe that the following additional provision recording source code is appropriate:

Unless otherwise ordered by the Court or permitted in writing by the producing party, all source code produced or exchanged in the course of this litigation shall be Confidential Information and access thereto shall be limited to the outside attorneys of record for the parties in this litigation and employees of such attorneys to whom it is necessary that the material be shown for the purposes of this litigation and not more than three (3) outside experts who have signed an undertaken pursuant to paragraph 5 but only after compliance with the provision of paragraph 5. Any notes or other information created as a consequence of such access shall also be Confidential Information under this protective order. Working copies of the source code shall be maintained by the receiving party in a secure facility which, in the case of Synopsys means Synopsys' Secured User Research Facility (SURF) and in the case of Ricoh, means a locked office at the law firm of Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky, LLP and which contains a computer which is not a part of any network and on which the source code can be loaded.

Erik K. Moller, Esq. November 20, 2003 Page 2

We believe that the secured facility we are offering is even more secure that Synopsys' SURF facility.

Very truly yours,

Edward A. Meilman

EAM/rra

cc: Gary Hoffman, Esq. Kenneth Brothers, Esq. Jeffrey Demain, Esq.



301 RAVENSWOOD AVENUE MENLO PARK, CA 94025-3434 PHONE 650.463.8100 FAX 650.463.8400 A LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP

December 7, 2003

VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

Edward A. Meilman Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky, LLP 1177 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036-2714

Re:

Synopsys, Inc. v. Ricoh Company, Ltd.,

Case No. C 03-2289 MJJ

Dear Ed:

This letter follows our discussion during the meet and confer teleconference on December 1, 2003 regarding the terms for the production of the source code for Synopsys' Design Compiler product in this action.

We stated that Synopsys could make arrangements at one of its East Coast facilities to provide Ricoh with more convenient access to the source code for Synopsys' Design Compiler product. You asked us to inquire as to the conditions for the production of the source code at such a facility. Synopsys can make arrangements to provide you with a secured location at its facility in Bethesda, Maryland. We would provide a computer that would be loaded with the source code to be produced by Synopsys and suitable software for review of this code. Synopsys will allow Ricoh to make hardcopy of specific portions of the source code. The hardcopy can then be reviewed, pursuant to the protective order, outside of the facility. You would have access to the Bethesda facility during regular business hours without need to make any special arrangements.

In addition, we continue to offer the use of Synopsys' SURF facility at its campus in Mountain View, at which you would have 24/7 access.

Very truly yours,

Erik K. Moller

EKM:gg

cc: Gary M. Hoffman

Jeffrey B. Demain



301 RAVENSWOOD AVENUE MENLO PARK, CA 94025-3434 PHONE 650.463.8100 FAX 650.463.8400 A LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP

VIA FACSIMILE and FIRST CLASS U.S. MAIL

November 13, 2003

Edward A. Meilman Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky, LLP 1177 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036-2714

Re: Synopsys, Inc. v Ricoh Company, Ltd., Case No. CV 03-02289 MJJ and Ricoh Company, Ltd. v. Aeroflex Inc., et al., Case No. CV 03-04669 MMJ

Dear Ed:

During today's telephone conference you referred to the fact that your firm has previously put into place secure facilities compliant with government requirements for reviewing secret defense documents, but you did not provide us with much detail about the particular security systems you employed. In order to give us a fair understanding of what you are proposing, it would be helpful if you could be more specific about your proposal. It is our understanding that facilities qualified to receive and possess classified information must comply with requirements from the National Industrial Security Program administered by the Department of Defense. Those requirements are set out in the "National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual," which is available from the Department of Defense. See www.dss.mil/isec/nispom.pdf. This document is rather extensive. It would be useful if you could identify what provisions from this manual you would propose to implement.


To give you some idea of the nature of our proposal, I am enclosing a copy of a brochure describing Synopsys' SURF facility.

Very Truly Yours.

Erik K. Moller

EKM/gj

cc: Gary M. Hoffman √
Jeffrey Demain



Secure User Research Facility

S.U.R.F. Features

Restricted badge-secured access

15 private offices with key-code locks, hard walls and secured ceilings

Up to 15 separate networks with multiple nodes on each network

Configuration allows any number of networks to be merged into a single shared network

Firewall can be configured to permit or deny data flow between Synopsys and customers' or partner's networks

Separate fire and security systems


Shredders and confidential trash bins

Synopsys' Secure Information Program ensures that our technology leadership is matched by Intellectual Property protection leadership. Synopsys' SECURE USER RESEARCH FACILITY (S.U.R.F.) is an example of our commitment to safeguarding intellectual property.


S.U.R.F. is located on our corporate campus in Mountain View. It provides our business partners and customers a secure working environment separate from other Synopsys activities. Our customers and partners have used S.U.R.F. for tool-interoperability projects and other special situations

For more information please contact: Julie McManus, Secure Information Program Coordinator at (650) 584-5140. For legal questions, please contact Roger Klein, Deputy General Counsel at (650) 584-4058;

Synopsys SURF - Lab Configuration



Synopsys **SURF Lab**



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SURF Program

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Open Source Comments

Synopsys Secure User Research Facility

Description

- Secure and Convenient Access
 - o 24 hour access to S.U.R.F. facility via keycard with PIN.
- Work Environment Isolated from Other Users
 - o Equipment configured "standalone." No network access.
 - Private offices walled with secure ceilings.
 - o Independently accessible via keycode lock
 - o Shredders and confidential trash bins available.
 - o Lab configuration
- Maintenance and Support
 - Selected Synopsys tools installed on lab machines. Releases periodically updated.
 - o Synopsys tools and flows fully supported on-site.
- Location

S.U.R.F. Qualification Criteria

The S.U.R.F. lab facilities at Synopsys are available to qualified EDA vendors, approved by Synopsys to test and enhance EDA interoperability with Synopsys tools for the benefit of our mutual customers.

The EDA vendors applying to S.U.R.F. must adhere to all security requirements and guarantee Synopsys IP protection.

The following criteria must be met:

- There is a clear customer demand for the flow(s).
- · Synopsys IP protection is guaranteed.
- Vendor adheres to all security requirements.
- · Access is approved by Synopsys.

How Do I Apply?

Contact S.U.R.F. program manager at Synopsys:

Karen Bartleson tel: (650) 584.4840 fax: (650) 584.4102

email: karenb@synopsys.com

Page 5 of 8

- 2. Submit and fax the complete <u>Access Agreement</u>, <u>Usage Agreement</u>, and the <u>Nondisclosure Agreement (NDA)</u> documents to the S.U.R.F. program manager. You will then be contacted to complete the registration process and your application will be reviewed.
- 3. Upon arrival on the first day, S.U.R.F. coordinator will:
 - Escort you to security
 - o Receive photo ID and access codes
 - o Guide you to S.U.R.F. area
 - o Test badges to ensure accessibility
 - Lead you to private office
 - Test access codes to ensure accessibility
 - o Tour area to become familiar with what's available
 - Verify S.U.R.F. equipment and required software functionality with you
 - o Ensure everything is working
 - o Leave you alone to do your work in your private office
 - Application Engineer and system administrator available by contacting S.U.R.F. coordinator

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ACCESS CONTROL & SECURITY SYSTEMS.

A High-Tech Fortress

By PETER CASSIDY

Access Control & Security Systems, Sep 1, 2003

Ten years ago, Synopsys Inc. decided it needed a secure means of working out conflicts in its chip-design software. The company wanted to protect its intellectual property (IP) — and that of its customers. A central asset in the world of semi-conductor design, IP is often the backbone of a company's proprietary secrets and its most valued ideas and data.

To protect intellectual property during product development, Synopsis decided to erect its own miniature industrial "Camp David" right on its Mountain View, Calif. campus. The facility would provide a neutral venue for IP-rich discussions, and customers could be assured no IP would be kept or recorded by Synopsys or third parties.

According to director of quality and interoperability Karen Bartleson, customers were previously faced with the hard choice of working around a problem or exposing their IP to Synopsis — some of it involving trade secrets not yet protected by patents.

"We had to come up with a way to deal with customers, protect them, solve their problems and secure their intellectual property," says Bartleson.

To ensure Synopsis and its customers could work together while keeping control of their IP, Synopsys created a Secure User Research Facility (SURF), a set of technically isolated office spaces. There are 16 different SURF offices, each one completely isolated and off the network, with its own printers and computers and locking doors secured by smart cards and keypads that are controlled by the visiting customers' and business partners' pass codes.

The facility enables customers' engineers to arrive with their software and mount it on the isolated computers and work with Synopsys engineers, secure in the knowledge that their software will be wiped off the non-networked computers when they leave.

The SURF solution demonstrates the enduring relationship between physical security and information security. By creating a solution constructed of off-the-shelf technologies and security protocols, Synopsys was able to satisfy its customers that a critical security issue had been resolved.

The SURF is a secured, 24-hour accessible location for electronic design automation (EDA), tool interoperability development and testing with selected Synopsys products and design flows. The SURF is generally available to EDA vendors to address customer interoperability issues with on-site application engineering and system administration support. SURF can be used by two types of companies:

- Non-EDA companies that have purchased Synopsys products: i.e., commercial customers (designers); and
- Qualified EDA companies looking to validate tool interoperability.

The EDA vendors applying to SURF must adhere to all security requirements. The following criteria must be met:

- There is a clear customer demand for the flow(s);
- Synopsys IP protection is guaranteed; and
- Access is approved by Synopsys product teams and the legal department.

To access the SURF, a company representative completes an Access Agreement application, a Usage Agreement, and a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA), and submits them to the SURF program manager.

The Usage Agreement restricts use to what is specified in exhibit "A". An "audit" capability in the agreement is defined to enforce the restriction while simultaneously protecting any intellectual property brought into the SURF area.

The application is then reviewed by the SURF program manager who validates the proposed tool interoperability test plan, and secures authorization from Synopsys' legal department and the involved product marketing teams.

On a day-to-day basis, the SURF offices are administrated by the Synopsys security department. Once the SURF office is assigned to a customer/EDA vendor, that customer is in charge of authorizing access to his SURF office/lab via coordination with the Synopsys Security Department. The Access Agreement commits the Lab User to the "rules" of the SURF area.

It also records who is allowed to gain entry to the private office. In the case of multiple users, each person must be listed on the Access Agreement to gain entry.

The entry and usage protocols of SURF are straight-forward, allowing for ease of use and administration. Based on the user's need (hardware, platform, memory, disk space, etc.) the Strategic Market Development team SURF coordinator assigns an office/lab to the qualified EDA vendor.

To maintain physical access control to the SURF facility, the Synopsys security department provides photo smart cards protected by pass codes for each individual user. A Synopsys security officer programs the keypad with a unique seven-digit numeric code for each SURF user, and the seven-digit code is provided to the user in a sealed envelope.

Designated movement around the Synopsys campus is strictly enforced. SURF users' smart cards are bright orange, indicating access only to the SURF facility. All other areas are off limits to SURF users.

Users come and go through the outside entrance for the duration of their lab use. During business hours (Monday - Friday, 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.) lab users can also come through the lobby of Building A to get into the lab. There is no need to check back in each time entry is desired.

To eliminate any chance of unauthorized access each time a company is assigned to a SURF lab office, a security officer resets the codes and assigns new unique seven-digit codes to the SURF lab user(s). The SURF area is monitored by security cameras and guards.

The SURF badges and access codes to the private offices are reset at the end of a designated period. This will occur automatically so extensions to scheduled time must be prepared and executed with enough advance notice to prevent code expiration and are subject to open and available lab time.

The bottom line: Once the SURF private room is assigned to a company, that company owns the room. If the company brings a customer or a Synopsys employee to its private room, the guest must be escorted, and if necessary, must have completed the appropriate non-disclosure agreements.

Electronically speaking, the security of SURF users' data is ensured through isolation and a self-service data scrubbing protocol built into the system. It can only really be neutralized through fairly extreme neglect. SURF offices are not on any network. Users can't get e-mail at a SURF facility — it is completely offline.

Each time a SURF coordinator assigns a new company to the SURF private room, he or she re-images the Sun Solaris machine with default images, installs necessary Synopsys software and keys, and creates a new user name and home directory. SURF users load whatever software tools they have brought with them for interoperability testing onto the lab equipment.

When a user is through with his project at the campus, Synopsys security strongly recommends that the IP is deleted from the hard disks before handing over the room after completion of the project. In addition, the SURF lab coordinator deletes the user name and directory, and reformats the hard disk before assigning the room to another company.

Access Control & Security Systems and Indiana Document 70-8 Filed 01/06/2004 Page 8 of 8 Page 3 of 3

Although it has been very successful for resolving user operability issues, Bartleson says, it has also become a venue for important interoperability summits between Synopsys and its competitors.

As the industry matured, Bartleson says, interoperability became a bigger issue for customers using a number of software products to manage and inform their designs. With SURF, Synopsys and its competitors had the use of a venue to respond safely to customer demand that its software work together.

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v.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

No. C

STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER

1. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

Disclosure and discovery activity in this action are likely to involve production of confidential, proprietary, or private information for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose other than prosecuting this litigation would be warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the court to enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to discovery and that the protection it affords extends only to the limited information or items that are entitled under the applicable legal principles to treatment as confidential. The parties further acknowledge, as set forth in Section 10, below, that this Stipulated Protective Order creates no entitlement to file confidential information under seal; Civil Local Rule 79-5 sets forth the procedures that must be followed and reflects the standards that will be applied when a party seeks permission from the court to file material under seal.

2. **DEFINITIONS**

- 2.1 Party: any party to this action, including all of its officers, directors, employees, consultants, retained experts, and outside counsel (and their support staff).
- 2.2 <u>Disclosure or Discovery Material</u>: all items or information, regardless of the medium or manner generated, stored, or maintained (including, among other things, testimony, transcripts, or tangible things) that are produced or generated in disclosures or responses to discovery in this matter.
- 2.3 <u>"Confidential" Information or Items</u>: information (regardless of how generated, stored or maintained) or tangible things that qualify for protection under standards developed under F.R.Civ.P. 26(c).
- 2.4 <u>"Highly Confidential Attorneys' Eyes Only" Information or Items:</u> extremely sensitive "Confidential Information or Items" whose disclosure to another Party or non-party would create a substantial risk of serious injury that could not be avoided by less restrictive means.
- 2.5 <u>Receiving Party</u>: a Party that receives Disclosure or Discovery Material from a Producing Party.
- 2.6 <u>Producing Party</u>: a Party or non-party that produces Disclosure or Discovery Material in this action.
- 2.7. <u>Designating Party</u>: a Party or non-party that designates information or items
 that it produces in disclosures or in responses to discovery as "Confidential" or "Highly Confidential"
 Attorneys' Eyes Only."
- 2.8 <u>Protected Material</u>: any Disclosure or Discovery Material that is designated as "Confidential" or as "Highly Confidential Attorneys' Eyes Only."
- 2.9. <u>Outside Counsel</u>: attorneys who are not employees of a Party but who are retained to represent or advise a Party in this action.
 - 2.10 <u>House Counsel</u>: attorneys who are employees of a Party.
- 2.11 <u>Counsel</u> (without qualifier): Outside Counsel and House Counsel (as well as their support staffs).

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2.12 Expert: a person with specialized knowledge or experience in a matter pertinent to the litigation who has been retained by a Party or its counsel to serve as an expert witness or as a consultant in this action and who is not a past or a current employee of a Party or of a competitor of a Party's and who, at the time of retention, is not anticipated to become an employee of a Party or a competitor of a Party's. This definition includes a professional jury or trial consultant retained in connection with this litigation.

2.13 Professional Vendors: persons or entities that provide litigation support services (e.g., photocopying; videotaping; translating; preparing exhibits or demonstrations; organizing, storing, retrieving data in any form or medium; etc.) and their employees and subcontractors.

3. SCOPE

The protections conferred by this Stipulation and Order cover not only Protected Material (as defined above), but also any information copied or extracted therefrom, as well as all copies, excerpts, summaries, or compilations thereof, plus testimony, conversations, or presentations by parties or counsel to or in court or in other settings that might reveal Protected Material.

4. **DURATION**

Even after the termination of this litigation, the confidentiality obligations imposed by this Order shall remain in effect until a Designating Party agrees otherwise in writing or a court order otherwise directs.

5. <u>DESIGNATING PROTECTED MATERIAL</u>

5.1 Exercise of Restraint and Care in Designating Material for Protection. Each Party or non-party that designates information or items for protection under this Order must take care to limit any such designation to specific material that qualifies under the appropriate standards. A Designating Party must take care to designate for protection only those parts of material, documents, items, or oral or written communications that qualify – so that other portions of the material,

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documents, items, or communications for which protection is not warranted are not swept unjustifiably within the ambit of this Order.

Mass, indiscriminate, or routinized designations are prohibited. Designations that are shown to be clearly unjustified, or that have been made for an improper purpose (e.g., to unnecessarily encumber or retard the case development process, or to impose unnecessary expenses and burdens on other parties), expose the Designating Party to sanctions.

If it comes to a Party's or a non-party's attention that information or items that it designated for protection do not qualify for protection at all, or do not qualify for the level of protection initially asserted, that Party or non-party must promptly notify all other parties that it is withdrawing the mistaken designation.

5.2 Manner and Timing of Designations. Except as otherwise provided in this Order (see, e.g., second paragraph of section 5.2(a), below), or as otherwise stipulated or ordered, material that qualifies for protection under this Order must be clearly so designated before the material is disclosed or produced.

Designation in conformity with this Order requires:

(a) for information in documentary form (apart from transcripts of depositions or other pretrial or trial proceedings), that the Producing Party affix the legend "CONFIDENTIAL" or "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY" at the top of each page that contains protected material. If only a portion or portions of the material on a page qualifies for protection, the Producing Party also must clearly identify the protected portion(s) (e.g., by making appropriate markings in the margins) and must specify, for each portion, the level of protection being asserted (either "CONFIDENTIAL" or "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY").

A Party or non-party that makes original documents or materials available for inspection need not designate them for protection until after the inspecting Party has indicated which material it would like copied and produced. During the inspection and before the designation, all of the material made available for inspection shall be deemed "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL -ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY." After the inspecting Party has identified the documents it wants

copied and produced, the Producing Party must determine which documents, or portions thereof, qualify for protection under this Order, then, before producing the specified documents, the Producing Party must affix the appropriate legend ("CONFIDENTIAL" or "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY") at the top of each page that contains Protected Material. If only a portion or portions of the material on a page qualifies for protection, the Producing Party also must clearly identify the protected portion(s) (e.g., by making appropriate markings in the margins) and must specify, for each portion, the level of protection being asserted (either "CONFIDENTIAL" or "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY").

(b) for testimony given in deposition or in other pretrial or trial proceedings, that the Party or non-party offering or sponsoring the testimony identify on the record, before the close of the deposition, hearing, or other proceeding, all protected testimony, and further specify any portions of the testimony that qualify as "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY." When it is impractical to identify separately each portion of testimony that is entitled to protection, and when it appears that substantial portions of the testimony may qualify for protection, the Party or non-party that sponsors, offers, or gives the testimony may invoke on the record (before the deposition or proceeding is concluded) a right to have up to 20 days to identify the specific portions of the testimony as to which protection is sought and to specify the level of protection being asserted ("CONFIDENTIAL" or "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY"). Only those portions of the testimony that are appropriately designated for protection within the 20 days shall be covered by the provisions of this Stipulated Protective Order.

Transcript pages containing Protected Material must be separately bound by the court reporter, who must affix to the top of each such page the legend "CONFIDENTIAL" or "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY," as instructed by the Party or non-party offering or sponsoring the witness or presenting the testimony.

(c) for information produced in some form other than documentary, and for any other tangible items, that the Producing Party affix in a prominent place on the exterior of the container or containers in which the information or item is stored the legend "CONFIDENTIAL" or "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY." If only portions of the information

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or item warrant protection, the Producing Party, to the extent practicable, shall identify the protected portions, specifying whether they qualify as "Confidential" or as "Highly Confidential - Attorneys' Eyes Only."

5.3 Inadvertent Failures to Designate. If timely corrected, an inadvertent failure to designate qualified information or items as "Confidential" or "Highly Confidential – Attorneys' Eyes Only" does not, standing alone, waive the Designating Party's right to secure protection under this Order for such material. If material is appropriately designated as "Confidential" or "Highly Confidential – Attorneys' Eyes Only' after the material was initially produced, the Receiving Party, on timely notification of the designation, must make reasonable efforts to assure that the material is treated in accordance with the provisions of this Order.

6. CHALLENGING CONFIDENTIALITY DESIGNATIONS

- 6.1 <u>Timing of Challenges</u>. Unless a prompt challenge to a Designating Party's confidentiality designation is necessary to avoid foreseeable substantial unfairness, unnecessary economic burdens, or a later significant disruption or delay of the litigation, a Party does not waive its right to challenge a confidentiality designation by electing not to mount a challenge promptly after the original designation is disclosed.
- 6.2 Meet and Confer. A Party that elects to initiate a challenge to a Designating Party's confidentiality designation must do so in good faith and must begin the process by conferring directly (in voice to voice dialogue; other forms of communication are not sufficient) with counsel for the Designating Party. In conferring, the challenging Party must explain the basis for its belief that the confidentiality designation was not proper and must give the Designating Party an opportunity to review the designated material, to reconsider the circumstances, and, if no change in designation is offered, to explain the basis for the chosen designation. A challenging Party may proceed to the next stage of the challenge process only if it has engaged in this meet and confer process first.
- 6.3 <u>Judicial Intervention</u>. A Party that elects to press a challenge to a confidentiality designation after considering the justification offered by the Designating Party may file and serve a

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motion under Civil Local Rule 7 (and in compliance with Civil Local Rule 79-5, if applicable) that identifies the challenged material and sets forth in detail the basis for the challenge. Each such motion must be accompanied by a competent declaration that affirms that the movant has complied with the meet and confer requirements imposed in the preceding paragraph and that sets forth with specificity the justification for the confidentiality designation that was given by the Designating Party in the meet and confer dialogue.

The burden of persuasion in any such challenge proceeding shall be on the Designating Party. Until the court rules on the challenge, all parties shall continue to afford the material in question the level of protection to which it is entitled under the Producing Party's designation.

7. ACCESS TO AND USE OF PROTECTED MATERIAL

7.1 <u>Basic Principles</u>. A Receiving Party may use Protected Material that is disclosed or produced by another Party or by a non-party in connection with this case only for prosecuting, defending, or attempting to settle this litigation. Such Protected Material may be disclosed only to the categories of persons and under the conditions described in this Order. When the litigation has been terminated, a Receiving Party must comply with the provisions of section 11, below (FINAL DISPOSITION).

Protected Material must be stored and maintained by a Receiving Party at a location and in a secure manner that ensures that access is limited to the persons authorized under this Order.

- 7.2 <u>Disclosure of "CONFIDENTIAL" Information or Items</u>. Unless otherwise ordered by the court or permitted in writing by the Designating Party, a Receiving Party may disclose any information or item designated CONFIDENTIAL only to:
- (a) the Receiving Party's Outside Counsel of record in this action, as well as employees of said Counsel to whom it is reasonably necessary to disclose the information for this litigation and who have signed the "Agreement to Be Bound by Protective Order" that is attached hereto as Exhibit A;
- (b) the officers, directors, and employees (including House Counsel) of the Receiving Party to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for this litigation and who have signed

| 1 | the "Agreement to Be Bound by Protective Order" (Exhibit A); | | | |
|----|---|--|--|--|
| 2 | (c) experts (as defined in this Order) of the Receiving Party to whom | | | |
| 3 | disclosure is reasonably necessary for this litigation and who have signed the "Agreement to Be | | | |
| 4 | Bound by Protective Order" (Exhibit A); | | | |
| 5 | (d) the Court and its personnel; | | | |
| 6 | (e) court reporters, their staffs, and professional vendors to whom disclosure is | | | |
| 7 | reasonably necessary for this litigation and who have signed the "Agreement to Be Bound by | | | |
| 8 | Protective Order" (Exhibit A); | | | |
| 9 | (f) during their depositions, witnesses in the action to whom disclosure is | | | |
| 10 | reasonably necessary and who have signed the "Agreement to Be Bound by Protective Order" | | | |
| 11 | (Exhibit A). Pages of transcribed deposition testimony or exhibits to depositions that reveal | | | |
| 12 | Protected Material must be separately bound by the court reporter and may not be disclosed to | | | |
| 13 | anyone except as permitted under this Stipulated Protective Order. | | | |
| 14 | (g) the author of the document or the original source of the information. | | | |
| 15 | 7.3 <u>Disclosure of "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY"</u> | | | |
| 16 | Information or Items. Unless otherwise ordered by the court or permitted in writing by the | | | |
| 17 | Designating Party, a Receiving Party may disclose any information or item designated "HIGHLY | | | |
| 18 | CONFIDENTIAL - ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY" only to: | | | |
| 19 | (a) the Receiving Party's Outside Counsel of record in this action, as well as | | | |
| 20 | employees of said Counsel to whom it is reasonably necessary to disclose the information for this | | | |
| 21 | litigation and who have signed the "Agreement to Be Bound by Protective Order" that is attached | | | |
| 22 | hereto as Exhibit A; | | | |
| 23 | [(b) – Optional – as deemed appropriate in case-specific circumstances: | | | |
| 24 | House Counsel of a Receiving Party (1) who has no involvement in competitive decision-making or in | | | |
| 25 | patent prosecutions involving [specify subject matter areas], (2) to whom | | | |
| 26 | disclosure is reasonably necessary for this litigation, and (3) who has signed the "Agreement to Be | | | |
| 27 | Bound by Protective Order" (Exhibit A); | | | |
| 28 | (c) Experts (as defined in this Order) (1) to whom disclosure is reasonably | | | |

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necessary for this litigation, (2) who have signed the "Agreement to Be Bound by Protective Order" (Exhibit A), [Optional: and (3) as to whom the procedures set forth in paragraph 7.4, below, have been followed];

- (d) the Court and its personnel;
- (e) court reporters, their staffs, and professional vendors to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for this litigation and who have signed the "Agreement to Be Bound by Protective Order" (Exhibit A); and
 - (f) the author of the document or the original source of the information.
- Optional: 7.4 Procedures for Approving Disclosure of "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY" Information or Items to "Experts"
- (a) Unless otherwise ordered by the court or agreed in writing by the Designating Party, a Party that seeks to disclose to an "Expert" (as defined in this Order) any information or item that has been designated "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY" first must make a written request to the Designating Party that (1) identifies the specific HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL information that the Receiving Party seeks permission to disclose to the Expert, (2) sets forth the full name of the Expert and the city and state of his or her primary residence, (3) attaches a copy of the Expert's current resume, (4) identifies the Expert's current employer(s), (5) identifies each person or entity from whom the Expert has received compensation for work in his or her areas of expertise or to whom the expert has provided professional services at any time during the preceding five years, and (6) identifies (by name and number of the case, filing date, and location of court) any litigation in connection with which the Expert has provided any professional services during the preceding five years.
- (b) A Party that makes a request and provides the information specified in the preceding paragraph may disclose the subject Protected Material to the identified Expert unless, within seven court days of delivering the request, the Party receives a written objection from the Designating Party. Any such objection must set forth in detail the grounds on which it is based.
- (c) A Party that receives a timely written objection must meet and confer with the Designating Party (through direct voice to voice dialogue) to try to resolve the matter by

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agreement. If no agreement is reached, the Party seeking to make the disclosure to the Expert may file a motion as provided in Civil Local Rule 7 (and in compliance with Civil Local Rule 79-5, if applicable) seeking permission from the court to do so. Any such motion must describe the circumstances with specificity, set forth in detail the reasons for which the disclosure to the Expert is reasonably necessary, assess the risk of harm that the disclosure would entail and suggest any additional means that might be used to reduce that risk. In addition, any such motion must be accompanied by a competent declaration in which the movant describes the parties' efforts to resolve the matter by agreement (i.e., the extent and the content of the meet and confer discussions) and sets forth the reasons advanced by the Designating Party for its refusal to approve the disclosure.

In any such proceeding the Party opposing disclosure to the Expert shall bear the burden of proving that the risk of harm that the disclosure would entail (under the safeguards proposed) outweighs the Receiving Party's need to disclose the Protected Material to its Expert.

8. PROTECTED MATERIAL SUBPOENAED OR ORDERED PRODUCED IN OTHER LITIGATION.

If a Receiving Party is served with a subpoena or an order issued in other litigation that would compel disclosure of any information or items designated in this action as "CONFIDENTIAL" or "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY," the Receiving Party must so notify the Designating Party, in writing (by fax, if possible) immediately and in no event more than three court days after receiving the subpoena or order. Such notification must include a copy of the subpoena or court order.

The Receiving Party also must immediately inform in writing the Party who caused the subpoena or order to issue in the other litigation that some or all the material covered by the subpoena or order is the subject of this Protective Order. In addition, the Receiving Party must deliver a copy of this Stipulated Protective Order promptly to the Party in the other action that caused the subpoena or order to issue.

The purpose of imposing these duties is to alert the interested parties to the existence of this Protective Order and to afford the Designating Party in this case an opportunity to try to

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protect its confidentiality interests in the court from which the subpoena or order issued. The Designating Party shall bear the burdens and the expenses of seeking protection in that court of its confidential material – and nothing in these provisions should be construed as authorizing or encouraging a Receiving Party in this action to disobey a lawful directive from another court.

9. <u>UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF PROTECTED MATERIAL</u>

If a Receiving Party learns that, by inadvertence or otherwise, it has disclosed Protected Material to any person or in any circumstance not authorized under this Stipulated Protective Order, the Receiving Party must immediately (a) notify in writing the Designating Party of the unauthorized disclosures, (b) use its best efforts to retrieve all copies of the Protected Material, (c) inform the person or persons to whom unauthorized disclosures were made of all the terms of this Order, and (d) request such person or persons to execute the "Acknowledgment and Agreement to Be Bound" that is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

- 10. FILING PROTECTED MATERIAL. Without written permission from the Designating Party or a court order secured after appropriate notice to all interested persons, a Party may not file in the public record in this action any Protected Material. A Party that seeks to file under seal any Protected Material must comply with Civil Local Rule 79-5.
- 11. FINAL DISPOSITION. Unless otherwise ordered or agreed in writing by the Producing Party, within sixty days after the final termination of this action, each Receiving Party must return all Protected Material to the Producing Party. As used in this subdivision, "all Protected Material" includes all copies, abstracts, compilations, summaries or any other form of reproducing or capturing any of the Protected Material. With permission in writing from the Designating Party, the Receiving Party may destroy some or all of the Protected Material instead of returning it. Whether the Protected Material is returned or destroyed, the Receiving Party must submit a written certification to the Producing Party (and, if not the same person or entity, to the Designating Party) by the sixty day deadline that identifies (by category, where appropriate) all the Protected Material that was returned

| 1 | or destroyed and that affirms that the Receiving Party has not retained any copies, abstracts, | | | | |
|----|---|--|--|--|--|
| 2 | compilations, summaries or other forms of reproducing or capturing any of the Protected Material. | | | | |
| 3 | Notwithstanding this provision, Counsel are entitled to retain an archival copy of all pleadings, | | | | |
| 4 | motion papers, transcripts, legal memoranda, correspondence or attorney work product, even if such | | | | |
| 5 | materials contain Protected Material. Any such archival copies that contain or constitute Protected | | | | |
| 6 | Material remain subject to this Protective Order as set forth in Section 4 (DURATION), above. | | | | |
| 7 | | | | | |
| 8 | 12. MISCELLANEOUS | | | | |
| 9 | 12.1 <u>Right to Further Relief</u> . Nothing in this Order abridges the right of any person | | | | |
| 10 | to seek its modification by the Court in the future. | | | | |
| 11 | 12.2 <u>Right to Assert Other Objections</u> . By stipulating to the entry of this Protective | | | | |
| 12 | Order no Party waives any right it otherwise would have to object to disclosing or producing any | | | | |
| 13 | information or item on any ground not addressed in this Stipulated Protective Order. Similarly, no | | | | |
| 14 | Party waives any right to object on any ground to use in evidence of any of the material covered by | | | | |
| 15 | this Protective Order. | | | | |
| 16 | | | | | |
| 17 | IT IS SO STIPULATED, THROUGH COUNSEL OF RECORD. | | | | |
| 18 | DATED: Attorneys for Plaintiff | | | | |
| 19 | Attorneys for Figure 1 | | | | |
| 20 | DATED: Attorneys for Defendant | | | | |
| 21 | Theories of Belondan | | | | |
| 22 | PURSUANT TO STIPULATION, IT IS SO ORDERED. | | | | |
| 23 | DATED: [name of judge] | | | | |
| 24 | United States District/Magistrate Judge | | | | |
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| 1 | EXHIBIT A | | | |
|----|---|--|--|--|
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| 3 | ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND | | | |
| 4 | I,[print or type full name], of[print | | | |
| 5 | or type full address], declare under penalty of perjury that I have read in its entirety and understand | | | |
| 6 | the Stipulated Protective Order that was issued by the United States District Court for the Northern | | | |
| 7 | District of California on [date] in the case of [insert formal name of the case and the | | | |
| 8 | number and initials assigned to it by the court]. I agree to comply with and to be bound by all | | | |
| 9 | the terms of this Stipulated Protective Order and I understand and acknowledge that failure to so | | | |
| 10 | comply could expose me to sanctions and punishment in the nature of contempt. I solemnly promise | | | |
| 11 | that I will not disclose in any manner any information or item that is subject to this Stipulated | | | |
| 12 | Protective Order to any person or entity except in strict compliance with the provisions of this Order. | | | |
| 13 | I further agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern | | | |
| 14 | District of California for the purpose of enforcing the terms of this Stipulated Protective Order, even | | | |
| 15 | if such enforcement proceedings occur after termination of this action. | | | |
| 16 | I hereby appoint [print or type full name] of | | | |
| 17 | [print or type full address and telephone number] | | | |
| 18 | as my California agent for service of process in connection with this action or any proceedings related | | | |
| 19 | to enforcement of this Stipulated Protective Order. | | | |
| 20 | | | | |
| 21 | Date: | | | |
| 22 | City and State where sworn and signed: | | | |
| 23 | Printed name: [printed name] | | | |
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| 25 | Signature: [signature] | | | |
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| 1 | APPEARANCES | (Continued): |
|----|-------------|---|
| 2 | | DICKSTEIN, SHAPIRO, MORIN & OSHINSKY BY: GARY M. HOFFMAN, ESQ. and |
| 3 | | EDWARD A. MEILMAN, ESQ. (Washington, D.C.) |
| 4 | | |
| 5 | | Counsel for Plaintiff |
| 6 | | CONNOLLY, BOVE, LODGE & HUTZ LLP |
| 7 | | BY: FRANCIS DIGIOVANNI, ESQand- |
| 8 | | |
| 9 | | HOWREY, SIMON, ARNOLD & WHITE BY: TERESA M. CORBIN, ESQ. (Menlo Park, California) |
| 10 | | · |
| 11 | | Counsel for Defendants |
| 12 | | MacPHERSON, KWOK, CHEN & HEID LLP |
| 13 | | BY: ALAN H. MacPHERSON, ESQ. (VIA TELEPHONE) (San Jose, California) |
| 14 | | Counsel for Defendat AMI Semiconductor |
| 15 | | |
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THE COURT: Hi. Everyone is here. This is Judge

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Sleet. We're going to get right into the business of scheduling.

I have received the joint status report and the competing proposals for schedule and I have taken the liberty of making some modifications.

My approach to scheduling is not altogether rigid, and I will discuss matters with counsel and make adjustments that I think are appropriate to make, depending upon what counsel advise me and whether I'm convinced that the adjustment should be made.

So with that sort of a proviso, why don't we begin.

You pretty much don't agree on anything with regard to actual scheduling other than the cutoff, and that's not totally agreed for discovery. I think plaintiff proposes that all discovery be completed by the March 15, '04 date. The defendants resist that proposition and want to stage discovery, which the Court is inclined to do.

But if the plaintiff really feels -- plaintiff on this side --

MR. HOFFMAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- feels adamant about this, I'm willing to hear you on it.

MR. HOFFMAN: Well, we had thought it was appropriate, looking at it again this morning, your Honor,

we're willing to stage discovery.

We would like to start the opening expert reports a little bit earlier. The defendants have proposed April 9th. We would suggest April 2 and rebuttal April 16th and the expert reports.

THE COURT: Well, the opening actually based on the schedule I have crafted here would be 3/22.

MR. HOFFMAN: Okay.

THE COURT: With the rebuttals being 4/23.

Let me jump to the back end of this schedule. This case is going to come to trial on October 11 of '04. Okay?

We will have a pretrial order due date of 8/16 and we will have a pretrial conference here in this building on September the 13th at 9:30, commencing at 9:30.

We can now go back to the beginning. That will at least help give you some context for what we're going to talk about here.

MS. CORBIN: Right.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. CORBIN: Your Honor, I think there are some things that I should apprise the Court of.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. CORBIN: In addition to representing the defendants in this suit, I am representing Synopsis, which

is a company that is in the design synthesis business also in California.

THE COURT: Not a party to this action?

MS. CORBIN: They're not a party to this action. They filed a suit in the Northern District of California yesterday against Ricoh, basically on one of the same patents, the one patent that's in this suit.

THE COURT: The '432 patent?

MS. CORBIN: Yes. Essentially, it had come to our attention that the statement had been made to Mr. MacPherson, and this is the only indication we have because we cannot glean anything about the infringement allegations from the complaint that the bases of the complaint is really these defendants use of a product called Design Compiler that Synopsis manufactures and sells.

It came to our attention and then again late last week that, in fact, RICO was engaged in a worldwide campaign of sending letters to our customers. We got copies of some of those letters which RICO had sent to additional of the customers and indicated in the letter that that should be kept confidential, but it has come to Synopsis' attention, and they felt that it was critical to take the bull by the horns if that, in fact, is the case, that the genesis of this case is a Synopsis part.

And they are in California and a large number of the players, witnesses and the documents are there as well.

And the letters that have been going out to the other customers mention another patent that is a continuation in part of the patent we have in suit here. Synopsis does intend and had hoped to do that by today, but probably will not happen until Monday to file the motion to stay and/or transfer this customer case.

THE COURT: To stay the case out in California?

MS. CORBIN: No. To stay this case or to

transfer this case to California.

THE COURT: On what basis are they going to file a motion in this case? I'm not certain that I exactly --

MS. CORBIN: I'm sorry. The defendants, the defendants in this case would file a motion to stay.

THE COURT: You said Synopsis.

MS. CORBIN: I apologize. I'm representing those parties as well, and they feel that if the genesis of this complaint is really the Design Compiler part of Synopsis, that that issue could be handled in California and would resolve the issues here.

THE COURT: Sure. Sure. I understand.

Well, we can talk about this a little bit. It strikes me that there's no prejudice to either party since I

have you all here in embarking on a schedule in any event because discovery has to be done.

MS. CORBIN: I wanted to apprise you of the facts. I would have mentioned it in the status report. At that time it had been unresolved.

THE COURT: Certainly the Court recognizes should the motion to transfer be filed and should I rule that the case should be transferred, it will then come under the rules -- this is in the Northern District?

MS. CORBIN: Yes.

THE COURT: Which rules are very different from this Court's and you would embark upon an entirely new schedule, but I don't think you'd be any the worse for wear.

MS. CORBIN: Absolutely. I think we should proceed.

THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, anything further to that?

MR. HOFFMAN: I guess there's no point in getting into a debate over the lawsuit that they just filed.

Obviously, I just became aware of it. However, we've made no threats against Synopsis. We'll be moving to dismiss the lawsuit.

THE COURT: Why am I not surprised?

MR. HOFFMAN: There's no reason for my trying to

explain the issues at this point. That will be an issue that will be out there in California.

THE COURT: Well, apparently.

Okay. So with that, we can now go ahead and see what we can come up with here.

I see a difference in the Rule 26(a) time that you've -- deadline you've set. I had picked 5:30.

Is there a particular reason the defendants feel June 13 is more appropriate than 5:30? I thought we should let's get on with it.

MS. CORBIN: If the Court is inclined that way, we will do our best to do that.

THE COURT: I'm inclined to do that. I tried to sort of pick a compromise date as to amendment and joinder and I selected July 30. I don't know if anybody feels real strongly about that one way or the other.

MR. HOFFMAN: That's fine, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. As to the election and the production, the election of reliance on advice of counsel and production of those opinions, the defendant proposes ten days after the Markman. That's the first time I've seen that type of proposal on this.

I'm not quite certain why you would want -the Markman, by the way -- well, we'll just move along
in some order here, but perhaps you could tell me why you

feel that.

MS. CORBIN: Well, primarily it's just the reason, your Honor, that to rely on advice of counsel in a waiver of the privilege.

The privilege is important, so if the defendants feel that they would not choose to do that if it were not necessary to waive that privilege and that it's hard to know at the beginning of this case, you know, what the allegations are, but once there was a claim construction sort of defining the scope of this patent, then the defendants could make an informed judgment on that basis as to whether they really wanted to waive their privilege or not.

to make an order, and I will let plaintiff make his own argument, but I'm having difficulty, a little bit of difficulty with understanding why you couldn't make an informed judgment prior to the Court's disposition of the Markman question. I mean, it seems to me that if we get far along enough in discovery, in the discovery process, I mean, that's really the basis from which you are going to make that call one way or it shouldn't have anything to do with the call that I make on, you know, the construction of elements.

MR. HOFFMAN: Your Honor, you stated our concern. We agree.

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THE COURT: Now, I'm going to distress you a little bit, both of you, because I'm going to set that date, by the way, at 12/9, which I think gives counsel ample time. Discovery? MS. CORBIN: THE COURT: No. MS. CORBIN: Oh. I'm shifting on you a little bit. THE COURT: MS. CORBIN: Okay. The deadline for advice on reliance. THE COURT: MS. CORBIN: Okay. THE COURT: But only a month after will be the fact discovery cutoff. That gives you a little less than eight months. This is a one-patent case. I see no reason why counsel can't, with a diligent effort, get this case discovered by January the 9th, but I will hear from you. That's fact discovery? MS. CORBIN: Fact discovery. THE COURT: Yes. MR. HOFFMAN: That's fine with us, your Honor. THE COURT: Did you want to be heard further on that? MS. CORBIN: You know, your Honor, if that's what

you feel, we will do our best to accommodate that --

THE COURT: I don't want to set unrealistic dates.

MS. CORBIN: To the extent we're unable to accomplish everything we need, if we could come back to court.

THE COURT: There's not going to be a lot of room.

MS. CORBIN: Okay.

THE COURT: There's not going to be a lot of room. It's a fairly tight schedule as I see it. That date is based on the Court's considerable experience even in the short time that I've been here in this area and understanding generally how long it takes to do things.

I am willing, if you were to tell me there's going to be a lot of foreign discovery and there are going to be language problems, something along those lines, I might hear you, but I just don't see the need to spend ten months discovering in a one-patent case.

MS. CORBIN: Well, your Honor, that was part of the issue that I would get into, the phase when we talk about the appropriate scheduling, Markman and the claims construction.

Part of our reason, the defendants' reason for

wanting an early hearing on that is that we do believe that resolution of that issue has the potential to eliminate a large amount of third-party discovery related to the prior art system.

THE COURT: I'm going to give you a Markman earlier than the one you've asked for.

MS. CORBIN: Oh, okay. But we do have the inventors here and it's not completely clear to us yet, but it appears to us they're both in Japan. So we do have some foreign language issues and some international depositions and then, depending on where we end up with the claims construction, there really are a large number of people in this field who are involved in the early eighties in developing design synthesis software.

THE COURT: To the extent that there needs to be an extension of the fact discovery deadline to accommodate the deposition of some individuals, to the extent that that won't impact the case-dispositive motion schedule, I'm willing to be flexible.

MS. CORBIN: Okay.

THE COURT: Right up to the time of trial, quite frankly, and even after, if necessary. But this is a parochial concern --

MS. CORBIN: Okay.

THE COURT: -- that I have, that you should all

have. That is, giving the Court sufficient time to appropriately address any dispositive motions that I permit to be filed.

MS. CORBIN: All right. We'll do our best to live with January 9.

THE COURT: All right. Then that gets us into Markman and to that process.

I'm going to require that you meet and confer by the 9th day of January for the purpose of identifying elements in dispute and narrowing that field of conflict.

That's just a deadline. You can meet before then, whatever.

MR. HOFFMAN: Okay.

THE COURT: And, by the way, I'm going to impose on plaintiff to prepare this schedule, because there are going to be some dates that you will probably need to work out on your own.

MR. WHETZEL: We would be glad to, your Honor.

THE COURT: I'd like the exchange of initial claim charts to be completed by January the 16th. This is going to be rather rigorous here. I would like final claim charts, joint final submission by the close of business a week later, January 23. And that should include citations to the intrinsic record.

Just to talk a little bit about Markman, the process, I'm going to be interested to hear from you as to how much time you think it's going to take, but I know that it's early in the process. I wouldn't imagine that we need to set aside more than a day. I don't take extrinsic evidence in my Markman process.

MR. HOFFMAN: We would agree with your Honor.

A day, maximum, should be fine.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you agree.

MS. CORBIN: Yes, I agree.

THE COURT: All right. Then that helps.

I would like the Markman briefing process to be completed by February the 6th. An opening and an answer, or you can simultaneously exchange. You need to join the issues. I would suggest an opening and an answer.

We'll hold our Markman hearing on February the 20th, beginning at 9:30.

MS. CORBIN: Your Honor, if I could?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. CORBIN: So in your schedule, January 9th, the Markman process will begin the same day as the fact discovery closes?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. CORBIN: Which does not address, and that was the argument I was trying to make, the issue

that we have, in that we thought that starting that process earlier may eliminate a large part of what would be third-party discovery, and that was why in the defendants' proposal, we had started that process in August of this year and had hoped to get to that well in advance of the close of discovery so that we could make a decision and not be bothering these third parties with depositions and document production and so on should it prove to be unnecessary.

THE COURT: Well, you still both -- I mean, you want to have your Markman hearing?

MS. CORBIN: Yes.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I'm incorrect. Or October 17th. We can talk about that.

I am really generally not amenable anymore to doing early Markmans. I've been told that early Markmans will -- you know, Judge, we'll settle the case, we'll -- it will do this for the case, it will do that and, inevitably, I've been very disappointed with that. And I don't want to be disappointed again because it just makes me unhappy and you don't want me to be unhappy.

MS. CORBIN: No.

THE COURT: But I will -- if counsel want to talk about that with me and you convince me that, you know, Judge, it's really going to help us, this will really help us set

the direction of the case, may dispose of it, I'm not 1 unwilling to address Markman early. But I'm also not willing 2 to have the discovery process continues and have you come 3 back and say, Judge, there's additional discovery. We need 4 to reopen the Markman process. We've changed our position. 5 And it may be a perfectly legitimate, not dilatory tactic, 6 request. 7 Right. Although I would say to 8 MS. CORBIN: your Honor that discovery is really not so relevant to 9 Markman, since the Markman is, as you said, based on the 10 intrinsic evidence and the --11 I have lawyers coming in and 12 THE COURT: talking about prosecution history all the time and prior 13 art and things of that nature in Markman. 14 but --15 The file history is available 16 MS. CORBIN: to everybody presently. 17 It is. THE COURT: 18 MS. CORBIN: And presumably, the prior art as 19 well. 20

MR. HOFFMAN: Your Honor, one of the reasons why, in this case -- we agree with what your Honor is saying, but in addition in this case, so far we've identified one claim. There are 20 claims in the patent. We've identified at least one claim that we believe infringe, that we have alleged

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infringe. There may be many other claims. We won't know until we get discovery.

You know, Claim 13, I've identified this to Ms. Corbin, is being infringed. That's our position at least.

There are a total of five independent claims, 20 claims total. If we have an early Markman before we've taken discovery, we're going to wind up with two Markman hearings. It just does not make any sense in this case.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. CORBIN: Well, the whole -- the complaint -- the patent as a whole only has four independent claims, but using Claim 13 specifically, because that's the one you reference that you said was the basis at least at this point in time for the allegation of infringement, we believe there are claim elements there which if defined as commensurate with the scope of what is described in the specification would be straightforward, and if the Court were to conclude that, then it would eliminate, as we're saying, a large part of this third-party discovery.

If, in fact, plaintiff is going to read that specification or it's going to be its position to this Court that that claim is broader and covers all types

of design synthesis, then we are really going to have to do heavy duty third-party discovery, and many parties were developing this design synthesis software in the early eighties.

we believe if they construe it on the broader construction, we'll have to engage in this third-party discovery from quite a number of individuals and companies that were developing that material so we can mount our defense and show the Court that if construed in that broader way, that was already in the public domain in the early 1980's, well in advance of the filing of the application that resulted in this patent.

And that was really our concern because, you know, we conduct third-party discovery all the time but we try to tailor it.

Obviously, these defendants will have to do
it the best they can to mount their defense and it will
entail a large expense and time consumption of parties and
companies that really have no interest in the outcome of
this suit.

THE COURT: Counsel, your opponent says in addition to bothering people unnecessarily, you are going to spend a lot of money you may not need to spend.

MR. HOFFMAN: Your Honor, I think throughout all of this we're going to be able to focus issues and I

hope keep things under control.

Both sides have agreed on 240 hours on the number of depositions that the parties can do.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HOFFMAN: What we're going to do is wind up with multiple Markman hearings, which really makes no sense at all.

There are five independent claims. We just wind up with having to deal with other claims later on as we get additional discovery.

The arguments I hear Ms. Corbin making are arguments every defendant can make in every single case.

They're no different -- this is no different than any other case.

you determine jointly that you need to -- that it would make sense to come to the Court and ask for an early Markman with assurances that we're not going to come back and revisit Markman, I will certainly consider that request and see if we can insert you somewhere. But right now I do have this nagging concern about having to duplicate effort and I really don't want to leave that potential for duplication out there.

But I understand what you are saying and I certainly am a proponent of saving money.

MS. CORBIN: It's just not my experience, your Honor, that I've ever had two Markman hearings in any case I've been involved in. So it's often the case, and often in the Northern District, we have earlier Markman hearings, and I have found in my experience that it is helpful in at least narrowing the scope for both the fact and the expert discovery, but primarily this third-party discovery, which we know here in this particular case is going to be a big issue.

THE COURT: With all due respect to the Northern District, and they certainly are vastly experienced in this area, not more experienced than we are, but vastly experienced, we have a different view. I have a different view of the approach to patent cases than was taken in the Northern District generally.

I respect their view, but it does not suit what we believe to be the needs and the approach of litigants and the Court in this district.

MS. CORBIN: Okay.

THE COURT: But, again, if it seems that they are compelling reasons that serve the interests of all, and I do include the Court in that, to have an earlier Markman process and an earlier Markman hearing than the one the Court is presently going to set, I will consider that.

Okay. MS. CORBIN: 1 THE COURT: Okay? 2 MR. HOFFMAN: Your Honor, if I can just turn back 3 to one point. 4 THE COURT: Yes. 5 MR. HOFFMAN: I believe the hearing date you set 6 was February 20th. 7 THE COURT: Yes. 8 MR. HOFFMAN: Unfortunately, I don't have 9 my calendar in front of me, but I believe that's a that's 10 the week I'm supposed to be on vacation. I booked a 11 vacation with a number of other couples, my wife and 12 13 myself. THE COURT: All right. 14 MR. HOFFMAN: If it would be possible to move 15 that one week later, I'd appreciate it, just as a personal 16 17 item. THE COURT: Gail, would you see if a week 18 later --19 MR. HOFFMAN: Yes. I believe the vacation --20 and I can check afterwards, your Honor, and let you know, but 21 if that may be a flexibility. 22 THE COURT: I suspect we can do that. 23 Go ahead. 24 MS. CORBIN: It's a different point, so I didn't 25

want to --

THE COURT: All right.

MS. CORBIN: My only thought, sticking on the Markman, is that since the Court is not inclined to give us the earlier date, I still believe what the plaintiffs themselves had presented was to have an exchange of the proposed claim constructions and the meet and confer on that and sort of the joint -- so you would at least have a document.

It wouldn't be the briefing. It wouldn't be the Markman hearing, but it would be a document that set forth the parties' positions and their support for their constructions and to have that in advance of the day the discovery is closing I believe would be very advantageous.

THE COURT: I have no difficulty with that.

MR. HOFFMAN: I'm sorry, your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. HOFFMAN: What I would propose, I can work out with Ms. Corbin an informal exchange for some time in September that we can exchange initial positions. You know, outside of the schedule, I'll be more than glad to work out something with her.

THE COURT: I will go even further to suggest that -- you're talking about the January 16 exchange date?

MS. CORBIN: Yes. 1 Counsel are free to move that up. THE COURT: 2 Okay. MS. CORBIN: 3 And have it reflected in the THE COURT: 4 schedule. 5 MR. HOFFMAN: All right. 6 THE COURT: That was a deadline. 7 MS. CORBIN: Okay. 8 THE COURT: For me. 9 Okay. MR. HOFFMAN: 10 THE COURT: Now, I have taken, I don't 11 think it's unique any longer, I think it's probably 12 well-known, a different position on summary judgment, 13 my summary judgment process in patent cases now than 14 most cases simply because it's not a reflection, it does 15 not mean that I don't like the patent bar. 16 means that these motions can be burdensome. They're 17 complex. They involve the challenge initially of lay 18 persons like myself getting up to speed on the technology, 19 and because of the way I do my approach to scheduling, we 20 sort of have to get up to speed twice. 21 Judge Robinson, as you know, I think she's 22 brilliant. She does it one time. But I'm not yet quite 23 24 there.

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So what I require and will require in this case

| 1 | is that by the 8th day of March, you will have submitted |
|----|---|
| 2 | letters to me in support of or in opposition to the filing of |
| 3 | case-dispositive motions. So you can agree on your own |
| 4 | schedule for the exchange of those letters. |
| 5 | The letter should not exceed five pages. They're |
| 6 | letter briefs. And that's the process for that. |
| 7 | We'll hold a teleconference to discuss those |
| 8 | letters on the 23rd day of March at 9:30. |
| 9 | You're in California. That's going to be |
| 10 | a little early for you. Why don't we set that for |
| 11 | Gail, would you check 11:00 o'clock on the 23rd of |
| 12 | March? |
| 13 | DEPUTY CLERK: Okay. |
| 14 | THE COURT: Mr. MacPherson, have you been hearing |
| 15 | all of this? |
| 16 | MR. MacPHERSON: Yes. I can hear this, your |
| 17 | Honor, very well. |
| 18 | THE COURT: All right. |
| 19 | MR. MacPHERSON: Except for the last letter |
| 20 | brief. Your voice faded. |
| 21 | THE COURT: I'm sorry. March 23. |
| 22 | MR. MacPHERSON: The one before that. By March |
| 23 | 8th you submit letters, and then that whole sentence got |
| 24 | missed. |
| 25 | THE COURT: And then we'll talk about them on the |

23rd of March. 1 MR. MacPHERSON: Those letters, though, to 2 summarize the basis for summary judgment motions? 3 THE COURT: Yes. Whichever party is advancing 4 the proposition that they should be permitted to file, 5 and certainly there's the opportunity to resist that 6 proposition. 7 They're just the outline MR. MacPHERSON: Yes. 8 of what would be presented. 9 THE COURT: I call them letter briefs; you can 10 call them whatever. But that's right. It's not the brief 11 itself. 12 MR. MacPHERSON: Okay. 13 MR. HOFFMAN: Your Honor, on that, would 14 there be one letter from the person advancing it and also 15 a letter opposing it? 16 THE COURT: Yes. 17 MR. HOFFMAN: Okay. So we'd have to work that 18 out? 19 Yes. You need to work out an THE COURT: 20 exchange schedule on your own for that process. 21 MR. HOFFMAN: Okay. 22 THE COURT: All I'm concerned about is that they 23 get here by the 8th. 24 The dispositive deadline will be April 25

the 2nd. You should anticipate that I will rule one way or the other on the teleconference. There's not going to be a post-teleconference writing unless there's something that really has me scratching my head. But I will get to you within a few days, even if that's the case.

By the way, you'll get your Markman ruling within -- no later than 30 days after the hearing. And the reason that I can promise you that is because you're not going to get a well-analyzed opinion. What I'm going to do is issue an order, and it's the process that I employ until the Federal Circuit tells me to stop doing it because, as you know, there's de novo review above and I have been for the last almost five years now informally polling patent counsel and they're telling me that they really are not interested in what I have to say. That's fine. They were very nice about it.

But I really -- at this stage -- go ahead,
Ms. Corbin.

MS. CORBIN: That's your practice and that's fine. I'd be surprised because that wouldn't be my opinion about the reasoning of the Court.

THE COURT: I know some of the judges on the Federal Circuit do want to hear from us. I feel that those

who don't haven't said it. I wonder whether, in terms of trying to get decisions to our litigants, it seems to me to make sense. What you really are interested in is how I'm going to instruct that jury.

MR. HOFFMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: So that's my practice at this point.

Let's see. So opening expert reports will be due the 22nd of March; rebuttals a month later, on the 23rd of April; and the cutoff for expert discovery will be June 23.

Does that give you adequate time to complete that process?

MS. CORBIN: Yes. Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Now, I also convene, in patent cases and other complex civil cases, getting you on the phone not long before the pretrial conference.

On June 30 will be this particular -- I'm sorry -- July the 7th at 9:30. I'm going to call it a Daubert/status conference, and I say Daubert because I want the opportunity to discuss with you in advance of the pretrial conference any Daubert issues that you think might be extant, and we can do that at the teleconference or we could call it a Daubert/motion in limine conference. Whatever you want -- however you

want to style it is fine.

I want you to meet and confer on that by the 30th of June and then get me an agenda by July 2nd. It shouldn't take you long to file an agenda over here by July 2nd as to the Daubert issues and/or in limine issues that we need to talk about.

Of course, you will have the opportunity, and that's provided in my schedule, in my pretrial order form. The process for preparing and filing motions in limine is set out.

It essentially requires -- I limit you to ten a side and it requires you to get them in, I think it's ten days in advance of the pretrial order due date, or is it the pretrial conference? Pretrial order due date.

MR. HOFFMAN: Your Honor, if I can just back up for one second?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HOFFMAN: The conference on July 7th I believe you had indicated was at 9:30?

THE COURT: Yes. Let's back that up again to 11:00 o'clock. I will put that on at 11:00 o'clock. Thank you.

MR. DiGIOVANNI: Your Honor, with regard to the agenda, do you just want simple, one sentence, or do

you want argument?

THE COURT: I don't really want argument on it.

That reminds me. Let's just chat for a moment about how you get discovery disputes before the Court.

I've now adopted a process, it's a threetier process, where you initiate your complaint with the
Court about the other side's behavior in a telephone call to
Althea Brown here and she will give you a date for a
teleconference.

48 hours in advance of that date, submit to
me a non-argumentative, no more than two-page agenda letter.

I really do mean non-argumentative. And we'll get on the
phone and talk about it.

And if it's -- it's the type of matter
that it seems to me needs some additional elaboration,
I will let you write a two-page letter, an opening,
answer and reply, or release you immediately to engage in
motions practice. Probably not going to happen, motions
practice. But those three tiers of dispute resolution
are available to you.

I encourage you, I urge you, I implore you, please try to work out your own discovery disputes. It really does require significant work, given the number of

patent cases, particularly patent cases that each judge in 1 this district is carrying, and given the fact that we have 2 one Magistrate Judge and she does not do discovery disputes. 3 We do our own in one form or another. 4 We each have a different process, but one form or 5 another, we do them. So it can take up an inordinate amount 6 of the district judge's time, which I'm trying to guard 7 against, which is why I've gone to the telephone process. 8 Hopefully, there's a little trepidation in dialing that 9 phone. 10 That's that. I think we've accounted Okav. 11 for all of the important dates in the life of the 12 13 case. MR. HOFFMAN: If we could just go back to 14 the date of the Markman hearing. 15 Yes. THE COURT: 16 DEPUTY CLERK: Judge, it will be March 2nd at 17 9:30. 18 Thank you very much. MR. HOFFMAN: 19 THE COURT: Glad you reminded me of that. 20 Well, let's talk for a moment about, Let's see. 21 or maybe more than a moment, about -- we're going to move the 22 trial date one day. I've been advised that October 11 is 23 Columbus Day; that's a Federal holiday. 24

Now, counsel have, I think jointly suggested that

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the Court should set aside 12 days of its calendar to try 1 Why is that? 2 this case. Start with plaintiff. 3 MR. HOFFMAN: Basically, your Honor, we 4 had proposed ten. Defendants asked for more. 12. We 5 said fine. 6 We had thought it would potentially take ten 7 trial days. It may take less than that. 8 It will. THE COURT: 9 MR. HOFFMAN: In all candor. 10 I could live with the ten. It just MS. CORBIN: 11 seems like there's five defendants already and it's unclear, 12 if there are to be any other parties in the case, and we do 13 think there are going to be a large number of witnesses in 14 the prior art area. 15 THE COURT: Well, it is really five defendants? 16 We have Matrox in different --17 MS. CORBIN: Different entities. 18 I can't answer that question, your Honor. 19 just know four of the Matrox entities, separate entities, 20 each one have been sued. Whether that continues to trial, I 21 22 don't know. THE COURT: I understand. I understand that, 23

Are we going to have different Matrox personnel?

whether it continues.

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I mean, are there really different entities? 1 MS. CORBIN: Yes, there are different distinct 2 entities. 3 THE COURT: That are functioning, operating 4 companies? 5 MS. CORBIN: Yes. As I understand it, not 6 all of those entities, and I didn't write down, so I 7 can't indicate right now, some of those entities are not 8 involved and do not use design synthesis tools in their 9 business, and so I don't really know at this point in time 10 why they're in this case. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Well, when you say a large 12 number of witnesses, and I think you were specific to say 13 prior art witnesses, what do you mean? What do you 14 anticipate? 15 MS. CORBIN: Well --16 17 THE COURT: Or --MS. CORBIN: You mean number? 18 THE COURT: Yes. 19 MS. CORBIN: Well, there were at least 20 six, seven, possibly eight venues in the early eighties, 21 where this type of design synthesis software was being 22 23 developed. Some of those people now have found themselves, 24 a lot of them back in California, working for one of the 25

Synopsis competitors and/or have gone into academia and those folks are found at U.C. Berkley, Stanford and the University of Southern California.

I can't put a number on, at this point on how many of those people we would find critical to be able to come forward and describe, you know, their process that they were engaged in at that time.

THE COURT: So you base your estimate,

THE COURT: So you base your estimate,
it's principally on these witnesses, the prior art
witnesses is what you think is going to drive, from your
perspective?

MS. CORBIN: From the defendants' point of view, I think there will be a large number of the witnesses, plus if it turns out this is really about Design Compiler, you know, whatever witnesses are going to be testifying as to that part.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HOFFMAN: Your Honor, I guess our approach, we just gave an outside estimate on the ten days. In all candor, as I indicated, I think it's probably likely to take less than that.

THE COURT: Yes. I'm going to set it down for seven days.

MS. CORBIN: Okay.

THE COURT: That will, I think, give us ample

time to get it done. It will carry us over a weekend. 1 Actually two days, since we're starting on Tuesday. 2 MS. CORBIN: What is your trial schedule, your 3 Honor? 4 THE COURT: We start at 9:00 o'clock. We try to 5 keep to the schedule as best we can. We go to 1:00 for 6 lunch. We take a morning break of 15 minutes. We come back 7 after an hour for lunch. Then I let the jury go at 4:30. We 8 have another 15-minute break in the afternoon. 9 Now, theoretically, I think that gives you six 10 hours a day, but it really never works out that way. 11 MS. CORBIN: Right. 12 THE COURT: It's more like five and a half, five 13 and 15, somewhere in that neighborhood. I try to keep myself 14 and everybody else as much on schedule as possible, but we 15 all know that things happen. 16 MS. CORBIN: And is that a four-day week or 17 five-day week? 18 Five-day week. THE COURT: 19 MS. CORBIN: Five-day week? 20 Yes. And you'll be on timers, THE COURT: 21 so you'll be principally responsible for keeping your own 22 time. 23 I may this time place a limit on the openings 24 and closings. I had a bad experience recently where I 25

just thought the openings -- they were fine openings. It was principally the closings. They were very well done, but they were just a lot longer than they needed or anybody wanted, I'm sure including the defense counsel actually.

So I'm thinking about that and we'll talk about that at the pretrial conference and we'll talk about -- we will have a working pretrial conference. It will, in all likelihood, take a better part of the day, so you should be prepared for that.

Be prepared at the pretrial conference to talk to me about jury instructions. I will have read your jury instructions beforehand. I know that's the last thing that counsel want to talk about at the pretrial conferences is jury instructions, but they are so critical. They are critical in any case, but particularly in patent cases, and they're so hard fought and it's a contentious process and I can tell you now, let me preview for you, I'm going to beat you up about them. I know you don't want to agree, but you're going to agree. Believe me, you will. We'll get to a good set of jury instructions that everybody feels good about so we can have a properly instructed jury, but just a preview for you.

Let's see. I think that, from a scheduling point of view, pretty much does it. I'm interested in

understanding whether there have been any efforts to settle 1 this case, any discussion along those lines, if there's an 2 interest in having this matter referred to our Magistrate 3 Judge. 4 Are you considering another ADR approach or 5 something? 6 MR. HOFFMAN: From the plaintiff's viewpoint, 7 your Honor, we're always interested in talking about 8 settlement. Our interest is licensing. We're not trying to 9 stop anyone. We're interested in licensing the patent. So 10 we'd be willing to sit down and talk about settlement, you, 11 you know, with the defendants here. 12 THE COURT: No proposals have been exchanged 13 14 yet? MR. HOFFMAN: No. 15 THE COURT: Are businesspeople talking to one 16 17 another? MR. HOFFMAN: Not as of this time, your Honor, 18 but I would be more than glad to set up a meeting. 19 MS. CORBIN: Synopsis businesspeople attempted to 20 speak with the business folks at RICO, but we have not been 21 22 able to move that forward. MR. HOFFMAN: Well, your Honor, Synopsis is not a 23 defendant here. We have not made any allegations against 24 25 Synopsis, nor do we intend to make any allegations against

Synopsis.

MS. CORBIN: But is it correct, the basis of the infringement allegations is the compiler part that Synopsis makes?

MR. HOFFMAN: That is a part of it. It's the utilization of design compilers, part of the basis.

But our interest is we are willing to sit down and talk to the defendants here.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. CORBIN: It does not seem likely, if that's the basis of the infringement allegation, your Honor, that a settlement could really move forward in the absence of Synopsis. The customers are going to be looking to Synopsis if that's the basis of the infringement claim to get them out of this situation and so it seems to me the real party in interest is, any way you look at it, involving Synopsis in terms of a settlement posture.

MR. HOFFMAN: If the defendants are represented, we have no objection to Synopsis being included in that discussion. But our interest is to license the users, the people who actually make the semiconductors.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me -- go ahead.

MS. CORBIN: The one other thing, your Honor, and this only came to light to us at the very end of last week

and we were continuing to conduct our investigation, but we had indicated in our status report about amending the pleadings. We will want to amend the pleadings once we've lined that up to allege equitable estoppel because it is now our understanding that RICO had approached Synopsis about taking licenses to these patents for the Design Compiler software well over a decade ago and they refused to do so at that time and they dropped it and they never brought it up agaom.

In fact, RICO and Synopsis have been business parties to business deals from then till now, including, I think, Ricoh is a subscriber customer, licensee under this Design Compiler part.

So it would be these defendants' positions, once they're able to fully investigate that, that any allegations that are based on Design Compiler should be equitably estopped.

THE COURT: It does seem that Synopsis should be at the table somewhere somehow. Maybe not at this table, but I will leave that to you folks.

I would suggest that you have me include a referral in the scheduling order to the Magistrate Judge. You can then contact her or she'll contact you. She's very flexible. And she'll work with you. If you ultimately decide that you are not going to use her good offices, then

you don't.

MS. CORBIN: Right.

THE COURT: But if you decided it would benefit the process, you do.

MS. CORBIN: Is that a referral to be taken up at a later time?

order. Either you will jointly contact her or she'll reach out to you. She'll say, you know, what's the status of things. She's not going to order you to do anything at this point. You might pencil in a date or something. Maybe you don't.

MS. CORBIN: Okay.

THE COURT: She'll say we'll set a time and we'll talk again.

MS. CORBIN: Okay.

THE COURT: But at some point as you move along in the discovery process, it may occur to you that you want a neutral to get involved. You are not going to find a more able neutral for free, for sure, but even if you paid for one, you're not going to find a more able one, neutral. She deals with complex patent matters all the time. She's a very good neutral.

MS. CORBIN: Yes, I've heard.

THE COURT: And I would suggest that you have me

include it in the scheduling order. 1 MR. HOFFMAN: We very much welcome having that, 2 your Honor. 3 THE COURT: My form of order is around. In 4 fact, we're getting ready to put another one on the 5 web specific to patents, but there's something around 6 7 somewhere. It's on the web now. DEPUTY CLERK: 8 THE COURT: It just went up, I guess. 9 good. 10 Counsel, is there anything else we need to talk 11 about? 12 I guess the only other question we 13 MR. HOFFMAN: would have, your Honor, is on the interrogatories. 14 your rules we understand it's 50 interrogatories. We would 15 just ask that that be made per side. 16 I generally don't get involved. THE COURT: 17 really don't. I think the Federal Rules are more than 18 adequate to go over the discovery process. 19 MR. HOFFMAN: Fine, your Honor. 20 I guess the only other thing, MS. CORBIN: 21 your Honor, the defense proposal had been, and I guess 22 a letter came to the Court because I didn't understand 23 that we weren't in agreement. The defendants had originally 24

proposed fewer deposition hours. Plaintiffs had wanted

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240.

Part of our agreement to that, evidently, we didn't have a meeting of the minds minds and I was unaware of it, on our side we expect we're going to have to take depositions in Japan through a translator. My experience, it has been customary to have those hours count. You can't move any faster if you are translating.

THE COURT: Sounds reasonable.

MR. HOFFMAN: Your Honor, I think there will be very few depositions in Japan, but be that as it may, they had raised this issue and that was part of the reason why we changed it from 160 to 240. We took that into account.

If there's more time, I will work that out with Ms. Corbin. I think that's an issue we can resolve later.

THE COURT: Are you satisfied?

MS. CORBIN: To the extent if I need it, I'm going to be able to count those as 30 minutes instead of -- every hour as 30 minutes, that's fine.

MR. HOFFMAN: Your Honor, I would hope that neither side would say it's 240 hours, you cannot have 241 or 242. If anyone needs some additional time, I would think that's something we'll be able to work out.

THE COURT: I guess that should be adequate.

MS. CORBIN: We'll work it out. THE COURT: All right. I hope you don't need to resort to me. If there's an emergency, you can dial up chambers if I'm available and you have a discovery dispute. If you are in a deposition or something, I have been known to get on the phone. I don't like to do it, but in emergencies, where you're really at an impasse, I will. But I will yell at you first. Okay. MR. HOFFMAN: Fair enough. THE COURT: All right, counsel. Have a good weekend. Thank you, your Honor. MR. MacPHERSON: (Conference concluded at 2:45 p.m.)